Drivers of the Offshore Outsourcing of R&D: Empirical Evidence from French Manufacturers by Liza Jabbour & Maria Pluvia Zuniga
       
   research paper series 










Research Paper 2009/04 
 
























The Centre acknowledges financial support from The Leverhulme Trust            
under Programme Grant F/00 114/AM   
 
The Authors 
Liza Jabbour is an Internal Research Fellow in GEP; Maria Pluvia Zuniga is a Researcher at the 


































Liza Jabbour and Maria Pluvia Zuniga 
 
Abstract  
The pace of technological change and the challenges faced by companies to remain competitive in 
global markets have contributed to a global expansion of R&D transactions. This paper shows that 
French companies engaged in the offshore outsourcing of R&D are outward oriented essentially through 
exports. Further, single unit companies seem more active in this type of R&D transaction than 
companies belonging to a group. These findings suggest a stronger integration of small and medium size 
exporting companies into international networks of innovation. Technological sourcing seems to be 
leading this phenomenon more than cost-opportunities motivations. 
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6.  Conclusion Non-Technical Summary  
This paper presents an empirical investigation of the offshored outsourcing of R&D activities by 
manufacturing firms located in France over the years 1993-2001. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence 
that outsourcing of research and development (R&D) is becoming a central issue in business' strategies, 
is on the rise, and occurring in a global scale. The increase in the outsourcing of R&D is associated with 
the growing internationalization of technological activities, where the fragmentation of the R&D activities 
follows up the earlier process of globalization of value chains started with assembling and production. This 
ongoing transformation is influenced by the need to integrate international networks of innovation, driven 
both by cost-saving opportunities and technology sourcing motivations. 
The upsurge of R\&D activities abroad has stimulated an intense policy debate; including implications on 
employment (i.e. the replacement of white collar employees), countries' innovation capacity, and by 
extension, the well-being of national economies.  Hence a fundamental question on the phenomenon of 
R&D outsourcing is whether it levels off innovation by firms and under what conditions this works out. By 
permitting firms to optimize resources, both financial and technological, R\&D outsourcing might help firms 
level-off productivity of internal research by the virtues of specialization and flexibility in research, 
speeding product development and smoothing product life cycles, in addition to expanding the pool of 
knowledge (Cesaroni, 2004; Arora and Gambardella, 1994). It can be helpful to manage R&D costs and 
access specialized knowledge, use facilities and specialized infrastructure, amongst others. The 
externalization of activities is not an easy task for firms. There are important shortfalls: e.g. costs of 
integration, rejection of new knowledge by employees; difficulties in the exploitation of knowledge 
outsourced to third parties (notably the loss of proprietary rights, miss-specification of outcomes, etc.). 
These difficulties are much important when outsourcing R\&D takes place overseas. Contracting costs 
tend to be more seriously burdensome across national borders as they imply extra costs for 
communication in different languages and adjustments across different legal systems (Tomiura, 2005; 
Cusmano et al., 2006).  
This analysis shows several important findings for the understanding of companies’ use of international 
procurement of R&D services. Within the sample of domestic companies, the results show that companies 
that do not belong to a group are more likely to outsource R&D abroad. More importantly, integration to 
global markets, notably through exports is found as a meaningful driver of offshore outsourcing of R&D. 
Hence globalized companies are more likely to involve in international technology transactions as 
competition in the global product market pushes them to integrate global networks of innovation, without 
necessarily demanding a physical presence (cf. foreign direct investment) abroad. Lastly, consistent 
evidence is found on the predominance of technological sourcing motivation (searching of technological 
competencies) over cost-saving motivations (e.g. cost of researchers, tax-exemption on R&D, etc.). 
Hence having R&D linkages abroad is growing in importance as research activities grow in expense and 
complexity and new pools of technology creation emerge in the global landscape. 
 1 Introduction
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that outsourcing of research and development (R&D) is
becoming a central issue in business’ strategies, is on the rise, and occurring in a global scale.
For example, in a recent survey on 158 large European companies, 70% declared that they have
signiﬁcantly increased the share of R&D outsourcing (in total R&D expenses) over the past ﬁve
years, almost in the same magnitude as internal R&D (LTT-Research, 2006). In a survey
conducted in the United States (U.S.), almost half of the companies surveyed in a wide range of
industries declared to be involved with outside organizations; 28% had research contracts with
commercial labs, 22% with universities and 34% with other companies (R&D magazine, 2007).
Furthermore, about 18% of these organizations declared to have offshored some of their work
to China, and 19% of them to India.
These patterns are associated with the growing internationalization of technological activities,
where the fragmentation of the R&D activities follows up the earlier process of globalization of
value chains started with assembling and production. This ongoing transformation is
inﬂuenced by the need to integrate international networks of innovation, driven both by
cost-saving opportunities and technology sourcing motivations. There are others factors at
stake. The accelerating pace of technological change, the shortening of product life cycles, in
combination with higher costs of investment in many areas of technology, have all contributed
to increase the reliance on external producers of technology. In parallel, transactions costs in
global markets have decreased with international policy reforms (e.g. strengthening of
intellectual property rights, less restrictions in technology and foreign direct investment) and
new specialized producers of technology have emerged across the globe (Athreye and
Cantwell, 2007; Arora et al., 2001). At the heart of this changing conﬁguration the upsurge of
information and communication technologies (ICT) has played a major role by making easier
1the transfer of information and coordination through cross-border projects, and more in
general, the ways of conducting geographically dispersed innovative activities (Santangelo,
2002).
This paper investigates company and technology drivers of offshore outsourcing of R&D by
French manufacturing companies over the years 1993-20011. It aims at increasing the
understanding of the R&D offshore phenomenon. Although the internationalization of services
is still in its early stages (cf. UNCTAD (2006)), the upsurge of R&D activities abroad has
stimulated an intense policy debate; including implications on employment (i.e. the
replacement of white collar employees), countries’ innovation capacity, and by extension, the
well-being of national economies. Hence a fundamental question on the phenomenon of R&D
outsourcing is whether it levels off innovation by ﬁrms and under what conditions this works
out. By permitting ﬁrms to optimize resources, both ﬁnancial and technological, R&D
outsourcing might help ﬁrms level-off productivity of internal research by the virtues of
specialization and ﬂexibility in research, speeding product development and smoothing
product life cycles, in addition to expanding the pool of knowledge (Cesaroni, 2004; Arora and
Gambardella, 1994). It can be helpful to manage R&D costs and access specialized knowledge,
use facilities and specialized infrastructure, amongst others. The externalization of activities is
not an easy task for ﬁrms.2 There are important shortfalls: e.g. costs of integration, rejection of
new knowledge by employees; difﬁculties in the exploitation of knowledge outsourced to third
parties (notably the loss of proprietary rights, miss-speciﬁcation of outcomes, etc.). These
difﬁculties are much important when outsourcing R&D takes place overseas. Contracting costs
tend to be more seriously burdensome across national borders as they imply extra costs for
1The term offshore outsourcing of R&D is used here to refer to the transfer of the responsibility for R&D operations
to an external provider located in a different country than the recipient. Broadly speaking, offshore outsourcing of
activitiesrefertoa"differentcountrylocation"; thatis, theycanbeexecutedbyanafﬁliatedcompany(R&Dlaboratory
set-up) or by a third company (non-afﬁliated). We designate the latter as offshore outsourcing of R&D. That is to say,
the term offshore outsourcing still lacks a proper generally acknowledged deﬁnition.
2See for instance Veugelers (1997); Nakamura and Odagiri (2003); Cassiman and Veugelers (2002a)
2communication in different languages and adjustments across different legal systems (Tomiura,
2005; Cusmano et al., 2006).3
While the topic offshore outsourcing attracts important policy concerns, the empirical
examination still remains under-developed. There are not many statistics or data available on
R&D offshore outsourcing since information from companies is very difﬁcult to obtain. In
addition, the few statistics available focus on the international R&D investments made by
companies, rather than purchased R&D services. As a result, empirical evidence is scarce on
the drivers of this phenomenon and its consequences on ﬁrms’ technological performance. This
paper attempts to ﬁll this gap. It examines the company and technology drivers of offshore
outsourcing of R&D. Our analysis shows several important ﬁndings for the understanding of
companies’ use of international procurement of R&D services. Within the sample of domestic
companies, the results show that companies that do not belong to a group are more likely to
outsource R&D abroad. More importantly, integration to global markets, notably through
exports is found as a meaningful driver of offshore outsourcing of R&D. Hence globalized
companies are more likely to involve in international technology transactions as competition in
the global product market pushes them to integrate global networks of innovation, without
necessarily demanding a physical presence (cf. foreign direct investment) abroad. Lastly,
consistent evidence is found on the predominance of technological sourcing motivation
(searching of technological competencies) over cost-saving motivations (e.g. cost of researchers,
tax-exemption on R&D, etc.). Hence having R&D linkages abroad is growing in importance as
research activities grow in expense and complexity and new pools of technology creation
emerge in the global landscape.
The paper is organized as follows. The ﬁrst section discusses, brieﬂy, the literature and exposes
3Other costs include: higher employee turnover; lack of coherence, delays in schedules, appropriation of compe-
tence by employees and other companies, etc. International outsourcing may thus entail exacerbated costs associated
to asymmetric information and monitoring between parties.
3our main hypotheses. The second section describes the recent patterns in outsourcing of R&D
in the French manufacturing industries. Description of data and variables is discussed in the
third section whereas the fourth section presents the results. The main conclusions and policy
implications of this study are reported in the last section.
2 R&D Outsourcing and Offshored Outsourcing
Essentially the outsourcing of R&D addresses the question as to whether a company should
make or buy technology (which can be inputs or outputs). Most commonly discussed in
relation to the vertical chain of production, this issue has a long tradition in economics dating
back to the seminal work of Coase (1937). The simplest logic implies that ﬁrms would prefer to
buy as opposed to make as long as the costs of externalization are lower than in-house
production.
Most of the underlying sources of transaction costs of R&D are similar to those of mature goods
and services, including bounded rationality combined with uncertainty, and opportunism
combined with non-redeployable assets (such as R&D sunk costs, customized R&D output and
co-specialized complementary assets). Contrary to production, the cognitive and appropriable
aspects of knowledge (von Hippel, 1988, 1994) make difﬁcult the delegation of research
activities to outside companies. The speciﬁcity of the asset to be transferred may raise
information asymmetries between parties favoring supplier opportunistic behavior and
creativity degradation (Pisano, 1990; Williamson, 1975). Incomplete contracting is another
major factor deterring the outsourcing of activities. The partners might differ in incentives and
pursue their own goals more than the common goal (e.g. few incentives to innovate by the
supplier, few resources invested by the outsourcer), notably under the presence of outcome
uncertainty and information asymmetry, e.g. the value of the resulting innovation (Grossman
4and Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995; Aghion and Tirole, 1997).4 In this kind of contexts, the ownership of
property right on the results of research is a major element, because the owner can claim the
residuals that have not been speciﬁed in the contract. These risks, notably regarding property
rights, make R&D outsourcing less attractive. Others factors inﬂuence as well the viability of
outsourcing compared to internalization. These are the bargaining power of the partners, the
degree of competition in the suppliers’ side, and the number of potentially partners, e.g.
outsourcers (Grossman and Helpman, 2005).
Other reasons at stake are scale and scope economies. It is economically efﬁcient to produce a
certain product or service in a large volume or jointly with other products/services. The
question of externalization arises however, if the input or good is required only in a limited
quantity or in a temporary basis. It is less costly for the ﬁrm to buy them from specialized
suppliers, which are more able to achieve economies of scale and scope in the provision of a
specialized resource and so, more competitive prices. A crucial factor in the decision to
externalize R&D concerns the type of technology and the nature of innovation. In comparison
to the supply of goods and services in mature industries, the outsourcing of R&D is more
difﬁcult when the outcomes are uncertain, notably when R&D aims at developing radical
innovation and creative technological solutions. Hence not surprisingly, R&D outsourcing is
more frequent when it concerns generic technologies (Antras, 2005) and technologies involving
codiﬁed knowledge (Treﬂer, 2005), which are easier to understand and assimilate.5 However,
as products and technologies become more complex and inter-dependent and innovation relies
on an increasing range of specialized technological competencies, companies need to seek
outside collaboration with organizations specialized in those required ﬁelds. External
4As explained by Aghion and Tirole (1997), although outsourcing helps to mitigate the managerial overload no-
tably in innovation activities (e.g. search costs and management), it creates a hold-up problem, causing some of the
rents of the owners to be dissipated to the supplier.
5Davidson and McFetridge (1984, 1985) found that the probability of internalization is higher the more radical the
technology and the larger the R&D section of the ﬁrm.
5specialized providers of technology complement internal R&D work, which makes innovative
labor more properly devised between companies, and resources better allocated in industries
(Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Coombs and Metcalfe, 1998; Quintas, 2003).
Increasingly, the delegation of R&D tasks takes the form of outsourcing to international
suppliers. As regards internationalization of production, market and cost factors are at stake, in
addition to those inﬂuencing transactions of technology. The motivations for the delegation or
location of R&D activities abroad are basically two non-exclusive types: the search of costs
advantages in the production of R&D and the access to new knowledge and specialized
competencies.
For multinational companies, the conduct of R&D abroad responds to the need of designing
products in consonance with local tastes, accelerating entry into foreign markets, and the
lunching of new products as local ﬁrms are more familiar with national regulations.6 At the
same time, offshoring of R&D constitutes a way to deal with growing R&D costs by exploiting
cross-country differentials in the costs of labor and technology (lower costs of scientists and
engineers, more favorable tax treatments, etc.). In parallel, offshore outsourcing to specialized
suppliers brings other beneﬁts in addition to costs: access to 24/7 global processes so that
research activities are non-stop, they can be passed on between two teams in two locations.
This results in a compressed time for the project completion and speedier introduction of new
products to market; higher volumes of innovation and ability to tailor goods and services to
speciﬁc foreign markets.
The literature on the internationalization of R&D provides evidence on the growing importance
of "technology sourcing" motivations, notably in R&D intensive industries. The survey-based
studies by Florida (1997), Kuemmerle (1996, 1999) and Niosi and Godin (1999) suggest a rise of
6Researchers have long argued that when ﬁrms enter foreign markets, they face additional costs associated with
doing business in unfamiliar environments where local competitors have both tangible and intangible advantages
("the liability of foreignness"). These costs involve expenditures associated with acquiring information regarding
cultural, political and economic differences (Hymer, 1976).
6knowledge seeking activities, with diversiﬁcation purposes, and the emergence of
globally-focused R&D activities in subsidiaries. More recently, Thursby and Thursby (2006)
ﬁnd in a survey that "market growth potential" and "R&D personnel quality" are the top two
factors that drive multinational enterprises to offshore R&D to emerging economies.7 As
regards offshore outsourcing of R&D, cost and market factors have been also pointed as major
motivations. Using survey data on offshore implementations initiated by U.S. ﬁrms between
1990 and 2006, Lewin et al. (2008) ﬁnd that ﬁrms use R&D offshore more frequently in the
search of "cost savings opportunities" to improve the efﬁciency of the innovation process and to
increase "speed to market". Similar motivations are reported for Japanese companies (Ito et al.,
2007): access to local market (e.g. design product in consonance with local demands,
regulations, etc.) and the agglomeration of local ﬁrms and R&D institutions (universities,
public research centers,..).
In comparison to domestic outsourcing, the viability of international outsourcing R&D
relationships presents supplementary complications. The longer the technological,
geographical, and cultural distance between the supplier and the outsourcing ﬁrm, the higher
the costs of transactions. Contract costs tend to be more seriously burdensome across national
borders, reﬂecting extra costs for communication in different languages and adjustments across
different legal systems. Offshore outsourcing may entail additional costs associated to
asymmetric information and monitoring between parties. The risks associated to intellectual
property rights and the costs of knowledge integration, can be higher as compared to domestic
outsourcing. Further, accessing and managing R&D teams in globally dispersed locations
require particular coordination strategies as well as organizational forms for managing,
sharing, and exploiting dispersed knowledge.
7Although the supply of scientists and engineers (S&E) professionals (e.g. China, India, Korea) in emerging mar-
kets seems an increasing attracting motivation, companies frequently declare that the quality of intellectual property
protection is an inhibiting factor for R&D offshoring to these economies (Branstetter et al., 2006; Lewin et al., 2008).
73 Data and Trends
The analysis presented in this paper is based on the "Enquête Recherche et Developpement",
annually realized by the French ministry of research for the period 1993-2001. It is a
non-exhaustive survey addressed to ﬁrms having an internal R&D activity. It provides data on
the characteristics of the ﬁrms as well as on their innovative activity. More speciﬁcally, it
provides detailed information on the internal and external R&D strategies adopted by each
ﬁrm. On this basis, our analysis of outsourcing activities focuses on R&D performers
companies. This survey provides very rich information which has been rather unexploited to
this date. External R&D can be decomposed into R&D outsourced from domestic sources, e.g.
public organizations, universities and local ﬁrms, and foreign sources, e.g. international
organizations and ﬁrms located abroad. We limit the data to manufacturing ﬁrms for which we
have information on the production activity. Companies belonging to the R&D services sector
(whose main activity is selling technology) are excluded from the sample. Data on the
production activity is extracted from the ﬁrm annual survey "Enquête Annuelle d’Entreprises"
(EAE) for manufacturing sectors realized by the French ministry of industry.
The ﬁrms, in our sample, are concentrated in few sectors; 19% in mechanical equipment
industry, 17% in the chemical industry, 15% in electric equipment industry, 8% in the
pharmaceutical industry and 8% in the electronic component industry. In France, the share of
outsourced R&D has grown sharply, in relative terms, from less than 15% of total R&D
expenses at the beginning of the 80s’ to more than 23% in the 90s’ (Blanchard et al., 2004).8
According to the "Research and Development" survey, more than half of the ﬁrms in the sample
outsource part of their R&D activity during the period 1993-2001. A ﬁrst look to the data shows
that foreign ﬁrms, on average, have a smaller external R&D activity than French ﬁrms.
8Further, this evolution appears stronger in knowledge intensive industries: Birch (2003) reports a 14.6% average
annual rate growth of R&D outsourcing between 1997 and 2001 in the pharmaceutical industry.
8Moreover, among the French ﬁrms, those belonging to a group have, on average, the greatest
external R&D activity.9
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the intensity of outsourcing and offshored outsourcing
R&D by French manufacturing ﬁrms for the total sample. Domestic ﬁrms as well as foreign
afﬁliates present a similar evolution of their R&D activities. It shows that the domestic
outsourcing is larger than the international outsourcing and both types of outsourcing have
been steadily increasing over the period of the sample, especially international outsourcing.
Before reporting summary statistics, several points need to be mentioned regarding the data on
R&D outsourcing from this survey. First, outsourcing of non production overhead services
"External-RD" stands for the total expenditures regarding the outsourcing of R&D activities,
"Domestically-RD" stands for the domestic outsourcing of R&D while "Offshored-RD"
represents total expenditures regarding the outsourcing of R&D overseas. Second,
contracting-out to own subsidiaries is not separated in the outsourcing expenditure, as this
information (intra-ﬁrm and extra-ﬁrm outsourcing) is only available for very few years. Third,
arm’s length purchases or licensing payments are not included, as they do not imply R&D
activities as deﬁned in the survey (OECD, 2002).
Figure 1
Table 1 reports the percentage of ﬁrms, in each industry, engaged in the outsourcing of R&D,
and at the national and international levels respectively. Table 2 reports the intensity of R&D
outsourcing (expenditure per employee) for these companies. On average, 30% of French
companies outsourced some R&D tasks to externals over the period 1993-2001; but the majority
of this activity was conferred to national providers of R&D services. Only 3% of manufacturing
companies in our sample are engaged into outsourcing of R&D activities abroad. This very low
9However, there is no signiﬁcant difference between foreign ﬁrms, French afﬁliates and French independent ﬁrms
in regards of the internal R&D activity.
9share indicates that a very speciﬁc type of companies is able to overcome international
transaction costs and access global technology markets. Another point to remark is the
important cross-industry variability (table 1). The industries with a relatively high percentage
of ﬁrms engaged in the outsourcing of R&D activities include the pharmaceutical; coke, reﬁned
petroleum and nuclear fuel industry; the industry of other transport equipments, other non
metallic mineral products; and electrical machinery and apparatus. The industries more
intensively active abroad are also the same ones that report the highest activity in domestic
markets and in total outsourcing. Coke and reﬁned petroleum and fuel, followed by
pharmaceuticals appear as the two largest sectors being involved in international R&D markets.
Interestingly, in addition to the ﬁve most active sectors in outsourcing activities, the industry of
motor vehicles, trailers, and other transports, appears quite involved internationally: 5% of
companies are active in this activity compared to the mean of the sample (3%).
A better picture is given by looking at the expenditure per employee by sector: the sectors more
intensively outsourcing R&D are: the industry of mechanical equipment, the pharmaceutical
industry and the industry of electronic components. Interestingly, in pharmaceuticals, the level
of outsourcing represents around 80% of internal R&D investment per employee. In this sector,
outsourcing of R&D is almost as much as important as internal investment in R&D. Other high
R&D intensive industries such as electrical machinery and apparatus; ofﬁce, accounting and
computing; or radio, tv and communication equipment, report outsourcing intensities above
the mean. In the industry of coke, reﬁned petroleum products, the level of expenditure is much
higher than the internal investment, reﬂecting the importance of technology exchanges for
innovation. Other sectors such as the clothing articles and leather, wearing apparel products
are rather inactive in this ﬁeld.
10Table 1: Outsourcing of R&D in Manufacturing Industries
Outsourcing R&D Domestically Offshore
Basic Metals 0.26 0.26 0.03
Chemicals exc. Pharmaceuticals 0.31 0.28 0.03
Coke, reﬁned petroleum products 0.69 0.62 0.15
Electrical mach. and apparatus 0.28 0.25 0.02
Fabricated Metal Products 0.26 0.24 0.01
Leather, leather products & footwear 0.12 0.12 0
Machinery and Equipment 0.2 0.18 0.01
Manufacturing nec 0.26 0.23 0.02
Medical, precision and optical 0.31 0.28 0.02
Motor Vehicles, trailers, etc. 0.22 0.17 0.05
Ofﬁce, accounting and computing 0.24 0.21 0.02
Other Transport equipment 0.41 0.39 0.09
Other non metallic mineral products 0.43 0.41 0.02
Pharmaceuticals 0.65 0.62 0.11
Printing and publishing 0.18 0.15 0.02
Pulp, paper and paper products 0.28 0.23 0.03
Radio, TV and commu. Equipment 0.28 0.25 0.02
Rubber and plastic products 0.26 0.23 0.01
Textiles 0.21 0.18 0.01
Wearing apparel 0.08 0.08 0
Wood and products of wood 0.35 0.31 0.01
Total 0.30 0.27 0.03
4 Methodology
In this section we proceed to analyze the drivers of outsourcing and offshore outsourcing of
R&D activities. The censured nature of the data to zero (46% of the ﬁrms depend exclusively on
in-house investments in R&D and only 14.5% are engaged in the offshore outsourcing of R&D)
requires a special statistical treatment. An approach generally used to deal with the problem of
censured samples is the Tobit model.
By assuming that the disturbance term follows a normal distribution, the Tobit model combines
the probabilistic and ordinary regression with the method of maximum likelihood (Amemiya,
1973; Tobin, 1958; Wooldridge, 2001). The likelihood function for a tobit model involves then
two distinct components: (1) the process that determines whether the outcome variable is fully
observed or not and (2) the process that determines the score on the dependent variable for
individuals whose outcome is fully observed.
11Table 2: Intensity of internal and external R&D (expenditures by employee)
Internal R&D Outsourcing R&D Domestically Offshore
Basic Metals 21.46 3 2.76 0.23
Chemicals exc. Pharmaceuticals 60.19 9.97 7.59 2.39
Coke, reﬁned petroleum products 32.55 58.12 52.32 5.81
Electrical mach. and apparatus 74.64 8.28 6.94 1.34
Fabricated Metal Products 19.99 1.22 1.06 0.16
Leather, leather products & footwear 15.21 0.46 0.46 0
Machinery and Equipment 30.74 2.53 2.1 0.43
Manufacturing nec 21.35 2.3 1.89 0.41
Medical, precision and optical in 63.35 7.47 6.02 1.45
Motor Vehicles, trailers, etc. 41.64 12.53 11.7 0.83
Ofﬁce, accounting and computing 118.17 13.98 11.05 2.93
Other Transport equipment 56.57 15.94 9.99 5.95
Other non metallic mineral products 22.8 3.37 2.99 0.39
Pharmaceuticals 71.89 55.41 42.01 13.4
Printing and publishing 20.73 1.86 1.75 0.11
Pulp, paper and paper products 11.08 2.46 2.09 0.37
Radio, tv and commu. equipment 136.94 15.67 13.48 2.19
Rubber and plastic products 23.9 2.89 2.45 0.44
Textiles 36.04 1.72 1.35 0.37
Wearing apparel 37.37 0.95 0.77 0.18
Wood and products of wood 13.91 1.19 1.03 0.15
Total 49.32 10.74 8.54 2.2
4.1 Explanatory factors
We relate the outsourcing of R&D to several company and industry characteristics. Our
dependent (s) variable (s) is the intensity of outsourced R&D -total, domestic and overseas -, to
the ﬁrm’s scale, in separated models. On the right-hand side, the explanatory variables include
company characteristics: company size, intensity of internal R&D, export activity, the
outsourcing of manufacturing tasks, technology gap, a dummy indicating whether the
company is an afﬁliate of a French group, and a dummy indicating whether the company is an
afﬁliate of a foreign group. The choice of these ﬁrm level covariates is guided by theoretical
considerations as well as empirical evidence. All covariates, except for the ones representing
the status of the ﬁrm10, are lagged by one period in order to mitigate potential endogeneity
10These variables are dummies representing the afﬁliation of the ﬁrm to French or foreign group as well as the
involvement of the ﬁrm in the outsourcing of manufacturing tasks. These variables do not vary within the time
period of our study.
12concerns. Further, a set of industry and time dummies is included.11
The intensity of outsourcing is explained ﬁrst by the intensity of in-house R&D expenditures
scaled by the workforce of the ﬁrm. Theory and empirics tend to conﬁrm that R&D intensive
ﬁrms are more likely to engage in the outsourcing of technology and in open innovation
strategies in general (Kaiser, 2002; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002b; Mol, 2005) .12 As Cohen and
Levinthal (1989, 1990) and Kamien and Zang (2000) demonstrate, internal R&D increases the
beneﬁt of external knowledge. Internal R&D plays a double role: it constitutes the capacity to
generate new knowledge while allowing the ﬁrm to better identify and assimilate external
knowledge (e.g. integrate it to the innovation process and manufacturing). This argument is
advanced by the open-innovation paradigm (Chesbrough, 2003) that is increasingly being
adopted in numerous industries where interactions with externals by means of buying or
licensing technology from other companies are necessary for being at the forefront of
innovation. The relationship is less clear-cut regarding offshore outsourcing of innovation
activities and there are not many studies on this topic. Recently, in a study of outsourcing
activities by Italian companies, Cusmano et al. (2006) found that the level of R&D intensity
explains signiﬁcantly outsourcing activities but it was not inﬂuential on offshore outsourcing of
R&D.13 In principle, as companies are more R&D intensive, one would expect these companies
to have products which are more complex and that are embedded with company-speciﬁc
competencies. These R&D tasks would demand a close interaction between providers and the
company. In addition, as knowledge is more central to the company, concerns are strong
regarding full appropriability of R&D outcomes.
We include an additional indicator on the technological nature of the company. We take into
11The dependent (s) variable (s) as well as all of the explanatory variables, except for the dummies and the research
intensity variable, are expressed in natural logarithm.
12At the industry level, for a sample of Dutch manufacturing industries, Mol (2005) ﬁnds that R&D intensity be-
came a positive predictor for changes in outsourcing levels over the 1990s, suggesting ﬁrms in R&D intensive indus-
tries have increasingly started to rely on partnership relations with outside suppliers.
13A similar ﬁnding is reported by Tomiura (2006) on outsourcing of manufacturing abroad.
13account a measure of the quality of research proxied by the number of researchers over total
employees. At the difference of R&D expenditures per employee which would measure
intensity in terms of volume of R&D, and includes all types of R&D resources (technicians,
engineers, researchers and other related human skills for R&D); this indicator reﬂects the level
of sophistication of skills conducted in the company. The relationship with outsourcing is
ambiguous; in one hand, companies with high-level human capital would tend to focus on core
competencies while leaving to the market the provision of complementary downstream
technologies. On the other hand, this type of companies would be less likely to interact with
outsiders as they may found more risky and difﬁcult to delegate R&D tasks that could be more
complex and delicate to implement and require a high level of sophisticated human capital.14
The empirical evidence tends to suggest that larger ﬁrms are more likely to engage into
outsourcing (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002a,b) as they are more
able to overcome transaction and agency costs and have a higher bargaining power (Veugelers,
1997). Furthermore, it is often argued that their propensity to delegate R&D activities is higher
as these ﬁrms can have stronger ﬁnancial resources allowing them to afford more important
capabilities in intellectual property practice.15 Small and medium enterprises have difﬁculties
in achieving economies of scale and scope in the provision of tertiary functions and they are
less actives in R&D outsourcing as they have less and simpler needs than larger companies. By
extension, it is expected that size matters more for outsourcing overseas. However, recent
evidence casts doubts about the relationship of size and outsourcing of R&D abroad. Using a
recent survey on offshoring activities by U.S. companies, Lewin et al. (2008) found that smaller
ﬁrms have higher probability of offshoring product development projects, indicating that
14More broadly, according to Cusmano et al. (2006) and Tomiura (2005), qualiﬁed human skills are deemed essen-
tial for contracting abroad, since this activity requires high level skills such as interacting with partners in foreign
languages and concluding contracts under different legal systems.
15According to Veugelers and Cassiman (1999), small ﬁrms are more likely to restrict their innovation strategy to
an individual strategy (to make or to buy), whilst the largest ﬁrms tend to combine external and internal strategies.
14offshoring enables smaller and more agile companies to augment their innovation capabilities
in contrast to larger and more resourceful companies. We include in all our regressions a
measure of the ﬁrm’s size represented by the total number of employees.
One can expect that the companies outsourcing R&D are different in terms of technological
needs and endowments, and notably, in terms of market orientation and production strategies.
Two indicators convey information on the ﬁrm business experience in foreign countries: we
include a dummy indicating whether the ﬁrm is afﬁliated to a French or a foreign group,
respectively, and variable representing the ﬁrm’s export intensity (the share of the exported
output in the ﬁrm’s total output). We expect that ﬁrms who are active into international
markets through exports are more prone to be in contact with international suppliers of
technology, as they face a more ﬁerce technology based competition. Further, if the company is
a part of a conglomerate, given that they are embedded in an international production network
(through their relationship with the parent and other afﬁliates abroad), they may be expected to
have a better access to networks of external providers of services (and potential clients), and
better bargaining position than companies that are not part of a group. Likewise, the origin of
the ﬁrm’s group should matter for the use of outside contractors. Foreign establishments,
which are by deﬁnition part of a multinational enterprise, can be expected to use higher levels
of technology internationally due to their technology speciﬁc assets, but lower levels at the
domestic level as domestic ﬁrms might be better informed about the local suppliers of
technology, regulatory aspects, national support for local alliances, etc.
A variable representing the extent of transaction costs in the domestic market is also included.
We use the number of potential buyers as a measure of transaction costs. If the potential buyers
are numerous, the supplier is not dependent upon a single partner and the spreading of sunk
costs over a larger size of customers permits the achievement of scale economies and lower
prices. However, the smaller the number of potential outsourcers, the bigger the bargaining
15power of a ﬁrm relative to any given partner (Tyler and Steensma, 1995; Pisano, 1990). We
include a dummy variable indicating if the ﬁrm is engaged in the outsourcing of manufacturing
inputs. We postulate that the outsourcing of manufacturing inputs inﬂuences positively the
reliance on external producers of R&D. We would expect that ﬁrms more frequently delegating
tasks across the chain of production, as they have more experience and abilities in negotiating
contracts, are more prone to engage into outsourcing and offshoring of R&D.
We include in all regressions indicators of the technical efﬁciency of the ﬁrm. Technical
efﬁciency is proxied by the total factor productivity (TFP) index, estimated using the
methodology proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). We build a measure of the technology gap
as the difference between the ﬁrm’s productivity level and the highest productivity level within
the same industry.16 According to Acemoglu et al. (2002), for more productive ﬁrms -closer to
the technological frontier-, innovation is more important than for technologically lagging
companies.17 For more efﬁcient ﬁrms, which can handle management overload, outsourcing is
a way to stimulate innovation-related investment, by sharing ex-post rents and increasing
returns to specialization. Moreover, efﬁcient ﬁrms are expected to engage more frequently in
offshoring because the outsourcing across borders entails high ﬁxed costs Tomiura (2005, 2006);
Jabbour (2008).18 We also add the cash ﬂow (scaled by the ﬁrm’s total employment) as well as
the R&D subsidy received by the ﬁrm. While there is no deﬁned theoretical argument about
their role, we would expect that ﬁnancially constraints hinder all modes of investing in
technology, either in-sourcing or outsourcing. Public aids to conduct R&D are expected to have
16We estimate TFP (total factor productivity) industry by industry, following the two digits French classiﬁcation,
on the basis of the entire Enquête Annuelle d’Entreprises sample.
17Some research has shown that ﬁrms’ decisions to vertically integrate depends on the company (country) distance
to the technological frontier. Acemoglu et al. (2002) develop a model based on managerial overload and technological
frontier, in an imperfect contracts framework. Accordingly, far from the technology frontier, imitation activities are
more important to quickly catch up and vertical integration is preferred. Closer to the frontier, the value of innovation
increases, encouraging outsourcing of (innovation) activities.
18In a study of determinants of production outsouring, Tomiura (2005) ﬁnds a greater relevance of productivitiy
for international outsourcing than for generic outsourcing. Accordingly, foreign contracting entails high ﬁxed costs
which might more likely to be incurred by high productivity companies.
16a reversed impact, increasing both modes of R&D investment; and decreasing the propensity
(and intensity) to conduct R&D activity abroad (both within and outside the boundaries of the
ﬁrm).
Two major technology factors should be helpful in explaining offshore outsourcing of R&D: the
cost efﬁciency of domestic R&D (cost-motivation) and the technological advantage
(technological motivation) of national industries. The former indicator is the ratio of the
number of patents per R&D produced in the French industry relative to the average in the
OECD countries for the same industry. It is thus a measure of the international relative cost
efﬁciency of R&D in the national industries. The latter is the revealed technological advantage
(RTA) indicator, measuring the level of the technological specialization of French industries.
The RTA of a certain industry corresponds to the ratio of the share of patents made by French
inventors in this industry in the total number of patents produced by France over the share of
worldwide patents in the same industry in the world total number of patents. If the share of an
industry in the total of French patents is higher than the world share, this means that France
possesses a technological advantage in this particular industry.
As industrial structural indicators, these variables capture broader characteristics of the
national industries in the production of technology. While cost efﬁciency may also reﬂect
cross-country differences in labor markets and wages, technological efﬁciency is a wider
indicator of the technological dynamism of the country in a given industry. It reﬂects in a more
general way the quality of research infrastructure, including universities and public research
centers, the availability of specialized scientists and engineers, etc. As pointed in the previous
section, we would expect that R&D offshoring, when driven by cost motivations, will be
negatively inﬂuenced by the cost efﬁciency in the industry relative to the world (OECD)
standards. When cost-driven motivations are less important than technology motivations, we
would expect that the reliance on outsourcing overseas will be lower, the higher the level of
17specialization found in national industries.
5 The Estimation Results
5.1 Comparison of strategies
We will now describe some characteristics of the companies engaged into the R&D outsourcing
and R&D offshore outsourcing activities. Table 3 reports the means of some key variables and
t-statistics for comparison of means between types of companies. It provides some ﬁrst insights
on the drivers of the outsourcing of R&D. The third and fourth columns compare ﬁrms that do
not outsource to those that are engaged in outsourcing agreements. The ﬁfth column presents
the mean comparison test between these two types of ﬁrms. The sixth and seventh columns
compare between ﬁrms that outsource exclusively at the domestic level and those that are
engaged in international outsourcing while the last column presents the mean comparison test
between these two types of ﬁrms. Accordingly, outsourcing ﬁrms, especially the ones that
offshore, are larger, both in term of output and number of employees (scale); are more intensive
in internal R&D (relatively to the number of employees), have a larger export activity and are
closer to the technology edge. However, there is no signiﬁcant difference between the level of
productivity of these companies and the level of companies that concentrate their outsourcing
activities to national R&D providers. The difference between these two types of companies in
terms of intensity of manufacturing outsourcing (this measure focus only on manufacturing
outsourcing in national markets) is not enormous neither.
18Table 3: Summary Statistics and Comparative Tests (t-test)
No outsourcing Outsourcing Outsourcing> Outsourcing Offshored Offshored>
Variable Mean companies companies No Outsourcing Domestically Outsourcing Domestic
Internal R&D 49.32 40.6 56.77 -7.04*** 46.94 83.35 -4.69***
Scale 623.91 399.38 815.55 -14.93*** 543.42 1551.59 -12.47***
Output 855975 408246.6 1238100 -12.22*** 634744.5 2870055 -9.53***
Export Intensity 0.5 0.48 0.52 -1.71** 0.48 0.64 -7.08***
Manufacturing 0.53 0.52 0.54 -2.13** 0.53 0.56 -2.34***
outsourcing
Technology gap 0.4 0.38 0.42 -2.81*** 0.41 0.43 -0.71
Cash ﬂow 56019.7 32021.06 76501.94 -8.58*** 51906.35 143028.1 -5.74***
R&D subsidy 0.04 0.04 0.05 -3.22*** 0.05 0.04 2.25
Nb Obvesrvations 16023 7380 8643 6310 2333
Note: t-tests adjusted for unequal variance between groups. Internal R&D (per employee), scale (number of employees), output, export intensity , manufacturing outsourcing,
technology gap, R&D subsidy. All variables are lagged one year respect to outsourcing and internal R&D activities.
5.2 The empirical determinants
Tables 4 and 5 display the results of the tobit model taking account of the endogeneity of the
in-house R&D investment.19 Even thought that explanatory variables are lagged one year, it is
likely that a spurious association between the unobservable terms and these variables exists,
notably regarding internal R&D. Ignoring this endogeneity leads to inconsistent estimates
using traditional Tobit estimation. The question of endogeneity or weak exogeneity of lagged
R&D investments might be more important in the case of R&D outsourcing abroad; more
precisely this link may be inﬂuenced by self-selection.20 It could be that only the most
productive ﬁrms might expand their operations abroad, including contracting out R&D
services abroad. Offshoring of production and R&D activities can be part of a wider growth
and diversiﬁcation strategy to serve foreign markets and we may see a similar or even higher
level of technological competence of these ﬁrms. We ﬁrst evaluate whether there is a problem
of weak exogeneity of right hand side variables and proceed then to ﬁnd proper instruments
19Tables 4 and 5 report marginal effects related to the level of outsourced R&D conditional on a positive outcome
while tables 6 and 7 report marginal effects related to the probability of engaging in the outsourcing of R&D.
20Theoretical as well as empirical research has argued that ﬁrm heterogeneity leads to a selection-bias in the inter-
nationalization strategies of ﬁrms (Helpman et al., 2004; Head and Ries, 2003).
19for these variables to alleviate this situation.21
The ﬁrst column, of every table, reports estimates on the total outsourcing of R&D expenditure
made by the ﬁrm. The chi-2 tests (Wald) on the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the in-house
R&D variable is rejected (chi2=15.6 with probability >chi2=0.000). The Amemiya Lee Newey
chi2 statistic conﬁrms the validity of instruments used to correct the endogeneity. We have
used as instruments for the in-house R&D intensity, an industry level indicator on market
concentration and the market power of the company (based on domestic market sales). The
instrumental variables are measured at the 2 digit French classiﬁcation level and are lagged one
year. Noteworthy ﬁndings are as follows.
In line with previous works (Veugelers, 1997; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002a), the intensity of
internal R&D and the size of the ﬁrm both increase the expected propensity and intensity of
R&D outsourcing. We corroborate the hypothesis of complementarity between in-house
technological investment and contracted-out R&D and the predominance of larger ﬁrms in
making use of independent suppliers of technology. Bigger ﬁrms are more likely to deal and
overcome transactional costs and more able to negotiate better prices in outsourcing markets.
The elasticity with respect to the ﬁrm’s scale is 0.036, in the probability of a positive
expenditure, whereas it is 0.083 in the model of levels of investment per employee (for above
zero investment observations). Larger ﬁrms are more ﬁnancially able to buy external services
and more likely to diversify research and forced to tap into a wider range of technological
competencies.
The sign of the coefﬁcient on our measure of human capital intensity indicates a negative
association with respect to outsourcing likelihood. We interpret this result as evidence for the
21Smith and Blundell (1986) have proposed a Wald (chi2) test of the endogeneity for the Tobit model. This test
modelsthenullhypothesisofzerocorrelationbetweenresidualsandright-handvariablesunderthedistributionF(m,
N-k), where m is the number of explanatory variables potentially endogenous. Relying on a two-stage estimation of
the tobit model, we instrument therefore the corresponding variables. Valid instruments must be orthogonal to the
error process in the structural equation.
20complexity of tasks and autonomy. Firms with a high percentage of scientists and researchers
in total employment are less prone to delegate specialized work to outsiders as a high level of
quality and sophistication of research is needed which is more difﬁcult to contract-on. Past
experience in outsourcing of production seems to be of weak inﬂuence in determining
outsourcing of R&D activities. This ﬁnding suggests that these two activities are different and
that determinants for contracting out are not exactly the same. Experience in outsourcing of
production stages or inputs do not necessarily enable companies to have better skills in
drafting, negotiating and searching suitable partners in the production of technology.
In line with Cusmano et al. (2006), outward orientation of the company raises the bar on
technology competition, pushing companies to be more open and integrated into innovation
networks. Further, as expected, companies afﬁliated to a group are involved more frequently
and outsource more R&D as opposed to domestic companies not belonging to a group. The
opposite occurs for foreign multinational groups, which are less frequently and intensively
involved in outsourcing, as opposed to this reference group. Afﬁliates of French groups are
8.5% more likely to outsource research whereas foreign afﬁliates are 4.4% less probable, when
compared to domestic non-group ﬁrms (table 6). These results hold as well in the equation of
domestic outsourcing. These results must be interpreted with care as the functioning of foreign
groups is intrinsically different (the decisions on R&D investment and outsourcing being made
on a global basis and throughout the network) and complicates the assessment of the
orientation or origin of transactions. Outsourcing of R&D activities by foreign groups might
essentially be made (and accounted for) in the home country, by the headquarter ﬁrm.
Besides, aligned with some theoretical studies the more distant the position of the company in
terms of productive efﬁciency -technology gap-, the less beneﬁcial and attracting the
externalization of R&D. Recall, that according to some models (Acemoglu et al., 2002), vertical
integration of the production chain activities beneﬁts the lagging company as it will permit the
21building of knowledge competencies through imitation and thereby the catching up in
productivity.
The results in the column 2 concern domestically outsourced R&D (expenditures per
employee). The coefﬁcients are pretty much similar to the equation on total R&D outsourcing.
There are one remarkable difference; the outsourcing of manufacturing is now positive and
highly signiﬁcant. Further, the impact of afﬁliation to a foreign group is ampliﬁed. The result on
the dummies on domestic and foreign multinationals suggests that there is a natural inclination
by domestic ﬁrms to use domestic producers of technology: domestic ﬁrms are better informed
about the R&D markets and know better the local institutional and regulatory frameworks, etc.
The third column reports estimates on the model of offshored R&D outsourcing. There are
quite important differences in the drivers when compared to total and domestically outsourced
R&D. While the company size, internal R&D and the outward orientation of the ﬁrm’s activity
appear as signiﬁcant factors, as in the case total R&D outsourcing, the human capital level does
not appear as a critical determinant explaining the outsourcing of R&D beyond national
borders. This result suggests that the complexity of research seems not to be inﬂuential in the
decision to contract abroad (neither on the amount of outsourcing). It may also mean that the
level of sophistication of human capital is not important to explain this type of outsourcing.
The international outsourcing of R&D is positively and strongly associated with the export
intensity of the ﬁrm. Moreover, the afﬁliation to a foreign group increases the propensity and
the intensity of R&D offshoring. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the intuition that companies active in
the international market are more likely to involve in international R&D transactions as
competition in the global product market pushes them to outsource technological resources
needed to achieve international pressures on innovation.
Not surprisingly neither the experience in outsourcing of manufacturing nor the number of
potential buyers are determinant in the propensity to outsource abroad (these indicators are
22built only on national basis). Firms involved in the defragmentation of the production chain,
are not necessarily applying this strategy to upstream activities beyond national borders. Lastly,
the effect of the technology gap is signiﬁcant: the less efﬁcient the company compared to the
leader in the same industry the less she will be engaged into the outsourcing of R&D overseas.
The fourth and ﬁfth columns report regressions restricting the sample exclusively to domestic
companies. We test here the relevance of the industry level indicators on technological
advantages and R&D cost-effectiveness. The company drivers of offshore outsourcing of R&D
are pretty much similar as those reported for the total sample although the size of the
coefﬁcients slightly changes. Surprisingly, French groups appear less prone to outsource R&D
abroad, as opposed to non-afﬁliated domestic companies. This result may imply that, since
afﬁliates of French group beneﬁt from the privileged position of the group within the French
Economy, connections to a large network suppliers, a large scale and high bargaining power,
that is not matched at the international level they are more keen to outsourcing domestically
compared to non-afﬁliate ﬁrms. It is important to note that we are not in measure of
determining if parent ﬁrms of French groups control afﬁliates located abroad. The status of
multinational of a French group may have an implication on the offshore outsourcing activity
but, due to data limitations, we are not able to distinguish between multinational French
groups and purely domestic ones. The ﬁrm scale effect is related to the ﬁxed sunk costs of
searching for and contracting with technology producers in foreign countries. Larger ﬁrms may
ﬁnd foreign contracting partners more easily due to their high reputation or stronger
bargaining power in the marketplace. Neither manufacturing outsourcing (experience), nor
researchers’ intensity seems to affect this decision and the amount of normalized expenditure.
The results on scale, export intensity and technology gap are the same as in the previous model.
With regard to technology drivers for offshore outsourcing of R&D, the ﬁndings are quite
interesting. Although international industry differences in R&D cost effectiveness appear as a
23signiﬁcant (negative) factor on the model, technology sourcing motivations appear much more
inﬂuential. Technological dynamism of national industries discourages companies from going
overseas to outsource R&D activities. This implies that if the industry has a relative
disadvantage in technology (with respect to the world average), companies will be more likely
to go beyond national borders to acquire lacking technological competencies. This result is in
line with recent survey studies (LTT-Research, 2006; Ito et al., 2007). In consequence, this result
indicates that French manufacturing companies outsourcing R&D activities abroad are driven
by knowledge sourcing motivations; e.g. accessing foreign pools of talent, S&E resources, etc.
We should mention though that this ﬁnding must be interpreted very carefully. Due to data
limitations, this indicator (number of patents per R&D expenditure) has been computed only
with respect to the OECD average; this average therefore does not capture the effect of costs by
non OECD countries. In spite of such shortcoming, we argue that although R&D costs are
dramatically lower in some emerging countries, their technological performance measured
with patents remains yet very low.
5.3 Offshore Outsourcing of R&D to Public and Private Institutions
We would like to know now whether there are differences in outsourcing abroad to public and
private institutions. As mentioned previously, specialized providers located abroad do not only
concern private companies but also public institutions of research. As evidenced in surveys,
there is an increasing interest in accessing scientiﬁc capabilities in reputed institutions
world-wide. Table 5 displays regressions on the separated outsourcing forms: domestic
outsourcing to private and public institutions; and offshore outsourcing to these two types of
organizations, respectively.
We focus essentially on the drivers of offshore outsourcing of R&D from public institutions and
private companies. Three main ﬁndings stem from this analysis. First, private sources abroad
24Table 4: Outsourcing and Offshoring of the R&D Activity: Marginal Effects
(R&D Outsourcing) (Domestic R&D) (R&D Offshoring) ( R&D Offshoring) ( R&D Offshoring)
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No. of obs 9708 9708 9708 6959 6959
Wald chi 2 2232 2618.7 941.5 786.28 771.9
Prob> chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity ( chi2) 12.6 30.69 5.28 3.12 2.99
Prob> chi2 0.000 0.000 0.02 0.07 0.08
Test of overidentifying restrictions :
Amemiya-Lee-Newey chi2 statistic 0.36 0.001 0.068 0.012 0.001
P-value 0.54 0.97 0.79 0.91 0.97




 represent respectively statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
25are associated to scale effects as the impact of the intensity of internal R&D is signiﬁcantly
associated to this type of outsourcing whereas this factors seems not be at stake for outsourcing
R&D activities from foreign public institutions. Likewise, companies associated to a group are
signiﬁcantly less involved than their counterpart in the use of offshore outsourcing to foreign
private companies but there is no striking difference between these two types of companies in
engaging into outsourcing from foreign public institutions. And third and most relevant, the
coefﬁcients on technological efﬁciency are negatively associated to the two types of offshore
outsourcing. In consequence, there is consistent evidence on the "knowledge sourcing"
motivation of companies. This factor in conjunction with the scale of the ﬁrm, are the only
explanatory determinants of offshore outsourcing from public research organizations. In
addition and reinforcing the ﬁnding on the importance of technology sourcing, the R&D
cost-effectiveness indicator by industry losses signiﬁcance when conducting separated
estimations on the types of offshore outsourcing.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we propose an empirical analysis of the R&D outsourcing and offshoring
strategies by French manufacturing ﬁrms. The pace of technological change and the challenges
faced by companies to remain competitive in global markets have contributed to a global
expansion of R&D markets. This evolution coincides with the rise of new pools of technological
activity and talent world-wide, which are attracting off-shoring of R&D to these locations, both
through outsourcing and location of R&D by global companies. This paper investigates
company and technology drivers of offshore outsourcing of R&D by French manufacturing
companies. Our results show that internationally oriented companies are more likely to
outsource R&D abroad. These ﬁndings suggest an easier integration of these type of companies
26Table 5: Outsourcing and Offshoring to Public and Private Establishments: Marginal Effects



















(0.005) (0.011) (0.002) (0.004)
Export Intensity 0.004
 0.002 0.001 0.003

(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Technology Gap 0.001 –0.026 –0.002 –0.014
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(0.007) (0.016) (0.002) (0.005)
Potential Buyers –0.008 –0.072
 0.004 0.002
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Cash Flow 0.006 0.041
 0.001 0.013
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Cost Efﬁciency –0.001 –0.004
(0.002) (0.004)
No. of obs 9713 9713 6963 6963
Wald chi 2 933.8 1713.7 202.8 1554.25
Prob> chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity ( chi2) 30.44 23.56 0.38 3.15
Prob> chi2 0.000 0.000 0.53 0.07
Test of overidentifying restrictions :
Amemiya-Lee-Newey chi2 statistic 0.15 0.004 0.022 0.017
P-value 0.69 0.94 0.88 0.89




 represent respectively statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
27in global networks of innovation. We also ﬁnd that single unit companies seem to be more
likely to outsource R&D overseas than companies belonging to a group. This reﬂects an
internalization strategy pursued by corporations compared to single unit entities which seems
more likely to engage into external and international networks of R&D. Furthermore,
consistent evidence is found on the technological sourcing motivation. The decision to offshore
by domestic ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly affected by the technological advantage of the French
industries. Firms located in an industry that beneﬁts from a technological advantage are less
likely to outsource their R&D activities overseas. Hence not only cost reductions matters for the
offshoring of R&D in general, but also the quality of competencies and notably, access to
specialized pools of technological expertise.
There are several lines of research on the question of R&D offshoring to be addressed in the
future analysis. Little is known about its consequences on technological and innovative
performance by companies. This evaluation also concerns the nature of technology that is
outsourced at a much more detailed level: which kind of R&D task is outsourced (e.g. product
development, basic research, prototype testing, etc.)? What is the nature of innovation
externalized (radical or incremental) and how it integrates internal R&D process? Our next step
is then to associate R&D outsourcing activities the technological performance of companies and
the type of innovation they produced; product and process innovation, new technologies.
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32Table 6: Outsourcing and Offshoring of the R&D Activity: Probability of A Positive Outcome
(R&D Outsourcing) (Domestic R&D) (R&D Offshoring) ( R&D Offshoring) ( R&D Offshoring)








(0.044) (0.020) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Manufacturing Outsourcing –0.011 0.037
 –0.000 0.001 0.003
(0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Researcher Intensity –0.795
 –0.328
 –0.085 –0.082 –0.122





















(0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Potential Buyers –0.040
 –0.043
 –0.003 0.002 –0.001











(0.023) (0.016) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
R&D Subsidy 0.015
 0.013
 0.002 0.002 0.003
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No. of obs 9713 9713 9713 6963 6963
33Table 7: Outsourcing and Offshoring to Public and Private Establishments: Probability of A
Positive Outcome



















(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Export Intensity 0.004
 0.001 0.001 0.003

(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Technology Gap 0.001 –0.012 –0.003 –0.013

(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Potential Buyers –0.007 –0.034
 0.005 0.002















(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Cash Flow 0.006 0.019
 0.001 0.012






Cost Efﬁciency –0.001 –0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
No. of obs 9713 9713 6963 6963
34Table 8: Correlation Matrix
Variable R&D Outsourcing R&D Domestic R&D Offshore R&D Domestic R&D Domestic R&D Offshore R&D Offshore
Outsourcing Outsourcing Outsourcing (Pub) Outsourcing (Pri) Outsourcing (Pub) Outsourcing (Pri)
R&D Outsourcing 1
R&D Domestic 0.9364 1
Outsourcing
R&D Offshore 0.4821 0.3028 1
Outsourcing
R&D Domestic 0.4243 0.4464 0.2397 1
Outsourcing (Pub)
R&D Domestic 0.7367 0.7745 0.2776 0.2236 1
Outsourcing (Pri)
R&D Offshore Outsourcing 0.1784 0.1231 0.3317 0.1692 0.1429 1
Outsourcing (Pub)
R&D Offshore 0.3909 0.207 0.7343 0.1843 0.3204 0.0899 1
Outsourcing (Pri)
Internal R&D 0.2613 0.2621 0.2784 0.1999 0.3056 0.1062 0.2016
Manufacturing Outsourcing -0.0057 -0.0047 -0.032 -0.0171 0.0287 0.0146 0.0011
Researcher Intensity 0.2003 0.2059 0.2094 0.1403 0.2454 0.0571 0.1541
Scale 0.0026 -0.0295 -0.1956 0.0064 0.1228 0.039 0.1374
Export Intensity 0.0333 0.0048 -0.0485 0.0164 0.0489 0.0274 0.0971
Technology Gap -0.1039 -0.0984 -0.0379 -0.0871 -0.1395 -0.0376 -0.1048
Potential Buyers 0.0187 0.016 0.0592 0.0389 -0.002 0.0332 -0.0055
French Group 0.1613 0.1717 -0.0007 0.0714 0.2497 0.0492 0.0779
Foreign Group -0.0693 -0.1301 -0.023 -0.0259 -0.0624 -0.002 0.0823
R&D Subsidy 0.1385 0.1551 0.0728 0.101 0.1009 0.0088 0.04
Cash Flow 0.1665 0.1453 0.1093 0.1364 0.1849 0.0794 0.1491
Technological Efﬁciency -0.1885 -0.1843 -0.1624 -0.1889 -0.1625 -0.0878 -0.1013
Cost Efﬁciency 0.0434 0.0427 0.0266 0.0355 0.0285 0.0184 0.016
Internal R&D Manufacturing Researcher Scale Export Technology Potential
Outsourcing Intensity Intensity Gap Buyers
Internal R&D 1
Manufacturing Outsourcing -0.0191 1
Researcher Intensity 0.5844 -0.0353 1
Scale -0.1795 0.11 -0.253 1
Export Intensity -0.0413 0.1001 -0.0859 0.4408 1
Technology Gap -0.0547 0.0768 -0.0512 -0.2014 -0.0833 1
Potential Buyers 0.1999 -0.0498 0.0558 -0.1737 -0.0387 0.2342 1
French Group 0.1229 0.0314 0.0286 0.3337 0.1176 -0.185 -0.0718
Foreign Group -0.006 0.0204 -0.0727 0.24 0.1692 0.0115 0.0825
R&D Subsidy 0.1447 -0.0087 0.186 -0.0429 0.0005 -0.038 -0.0259
Cash Flow 0.1999 0.086 0.1073 0.0427 0.1211 -0.1384 0.0331
Technological Efﬁciency -0.2947 0.0648 -0.2261 0.1075 0.0571 0.0485 -0.3173
Cost Efﬁciency 0.0562 0.3325 -0.0034 -0.0173 -0.0059 0.0152 0.0193
French Foreign R&D Cash Flow Technological Cost
Group Group Subsidy Efﬁciency Efﬁciency
French Group 1
Foreign Group -0.2485 1
R&D Subsidy 0.0778 -0.1405 1
Cash Flow 0.0695 0.1067 -0.0698 1
Technological Efﬁciency -0.0477 -0.0352 -0.0049 -0.1879 1
Cost Efﬁciency 0.0087 -0.0223 -0.0319 0.0541 -0.1123 1
35Figure 1: The Evolution of Internal and External R&D
Source:Recherche et Developpement, 1993-2001 (only manufacturing companies). Total Expenditure per Employee, 1995 francs.
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